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WHILE THE UNITED NATIONS SLEPT: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN
THE NEW WORLD ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout human history, philosophers, politicians, and
diplomats have contemplated securing a more permanent peace.
Seldom if ever have the nations of the world had lasting peace
within their grasp. Now is such a time.
The high hopes of the day have been expressed in the form of
building a "new world order"1 to make the planet "freer from the
threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure
in the quest for peace."2 The new world order, however, is more
than an aspiration for a safer planet. It is an opportunity to
reshape collective security in a rapidly changing world. It is a
process as well as a result.'
A. Development of Collective Security
This unified world concept is not new, and it has evolved over
the centuries.4 The "Pax Romana"' served the civilized western
1. Dan Oberdorfer, Bush's Talk of 'New World Order.- Foreign Policy Tool or Mere
Slogan?; Arguments Over Meaning Reflect Struggle to Define U.S. Approach, WASH. POST,
May 26, 1991, at A31. President Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft
crystallized their concept of the new world order during a four-hour fishing trip near
Kennebunkport, Maine, on August 23, 1990. Id. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had
previously used the phrase in an address to the U.N. Excerpts From Gorbachev's Speech,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1988, at A32.
2. Bush: Out of These Troubled Times... a New World Order, WASH. POST, Sept.
12, 1990, at A34.
3. President Bush characterized the new world order as both an end and a means to
an end, stating:
We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War.
A partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially
through international and regional organizations. A partnership united by
principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost
and commitment. A partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase
prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms.
President George Bush, Address to the U.N. General Assembly (Oct. 8, 1990), quoted in
HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 804-05 (1994).
4. Columnist William Safire traced the origin of the phrase "new world order" back
to the poetry of Tennyson, who, in 1842, wrote of the death of King Arthur. "The old
order changeth, yielding place to new." Oberdorfer, supra note 1, at A31.
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world for several hundred years as the Roman Empire preserved
peace, albeit in the form of imperial universality.6 Imperial
universality is achievable, however, only through the use of aggres-
sive military force.7 As a result, the doctrine of a world empire
has been long considered both impractical and undesirable!
Eventually, the notion of co-operative universality,9 based
upon the principle of equality among nations, took hold. In 1815,
at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the nations of Europe estab-
lished a long-lasting peace at the Congress of Vienna. 10 One
century later, upon the conclusion of World War I, a unified body
of sovereign countries created the first universal peace organiza-
tion, the League of Nations." Championed by Woodrow Wilson,
the League assumed the duty "to organize the vital forces of the
world in support of peace, security and human welfare.'
12
Sustaining hard-fought global peace, rather than merely
contemplating it, proved to be a more elusive task. U.S. isolation-
ism, economic collapse, and the League of Nations' failure to
respond to totalitarian encroachments ultimately doomed Wilson's
promising experiment. 3 In particular, the impotence of sanctions
against Italy made it clear that the League had failed, and that war
would return. 4
Ironically, the U.N. grew out of a wartime coalition." As
5. The Latin word "pax" signifies a "period of international history characterized by
an absence of major wars and a general stability of international affairs usually resulting
from the predominance of a specified political authority." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATION-
AL DICTIONARY 1658-59 (3d ed. 1986).
6. GEORO SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER
7 (1936).
7. Id at 10.
8. Id. at 10 n.1.
9. Id at 10.
10. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Maintaining International Peace and Security: The
United Nations as a Forum and Focal Point, 16 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1993).
11. FRANCIS P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF TIE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 4 (1967).
12. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCuMENTS 3 (World Peace Foundation 1949).
13. Id at 3-4; WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR, VOL. I: THE
GATHERING STORM 12, 83 (1948). Churchill felt that, as late as 1934, the League of
Nations would have been an "august instrument" in bringing "an overwhelming power to
bear" on Hitler and Germany. Id at 70, 83.
14. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 12, at 4. League sanctions were in response
to Italy's 1935 invasion of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia). CHURCHILL, supra note 13, at 156.
15. The 1942 Declaration by United Nations formed a wartime coalition of twenty-six
countries, each pledging to commit full resources toward defeating the Axis powers.
GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 12, at 570. This document came on the heels of the
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Allied forces advanced beyond Normandy, the framework for a
new international diplomatic organization was crafted at
Dumbarton Oaks.16 This framework was adopted into the
Charter of the U.N. ("Charter") and was signed on June 26,
1945."7 The primary purpose"8 of this new organization was:
[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts
of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes which might lead to a breach of the
peace. 9
The framers of the Charter intended that the nations of the world
would actively enforce their promise of peace. Among the
founders of the U.N., President Franklin Roosevelt sought to
create a powerful international organization that would respond
decisively against apgression in sharp contrast to the "toothless"
League of Nations.
Atlantic Charter, signed by the United States and the United Kingdom, which hoped to
establish a "wider and permanent system of general security" at the conclusion of World
War II. Id. at 4.
16. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 12, at 6. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
called for, among other things, a General Assembly, a Security Council, a Secretary-
General, and an International Court of Justice. Id.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 111.
18. See George K. Walker, United States National Security Law and United Nations
Peacekeeping or Peacemaking Operations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 435, 450 (1994).
Walker noted that many commentators believe that maintaining international peace and
security is the U.N.'s primary purpose based on its placement among the principles listed
in Article One of the Charter and on the "primary station" given to the goal of
international peace and security. Id.
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 1,1 1. The Charter states several other purposes for the U.N.
as well, including: (1) "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations;" (2) "to achieve
international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social, and other
humanitarian problems;" and (3) "[t]o be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations."
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
20. "[President Roosevelt] explained to reporters what he had in mind: If an aggressor
'started to run amok and [sought] to grab territory or invade its neighbors,' the new
international organization 'would stop them before they got started."' Stanley Meisler, 50
Years Ago, Hopes Soared as U.N. Began Life, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at Al.
19951
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B. The UN. in the Post-Cold War Era
For nearly fifty years, the Cold War hampered the U.N.'s
effectiveness as a tool of collective security. With the end of the
Cold War, however, sovereign states look to the U.N. with
renewed optimism as a forum for international peace.21 This
situation brings with it significant opportunities and solemn
challenges. In response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the
Security Council granted member states wide latitude toward
achieving Kuwait's liberation.' Because the Persian Gulf War
enjoyed largely unified support from the international community,
it was a decisive military and diplomatic victory for the U.N.
The U.N.'s success in orchestrating this collective security
endowed it with new and unprecedented prestige. With this
prestige came new opportunities, greater challenges, and higher
expectations. The U.N. has embraced this new role openly, as it
currently sponsors thirty-three missions worldwide, committing
approximately 90,000 troops at an annual cost of $3.8 billion.'
Truly, the U.N. has become the world's "peacebroker."'24
Since the Persian Gulf War, however, the shortcomings and
inherent limitations of the U.N. as a tool for maintaining world
peace have become readily apparent. Outdated bureaucracy,2
command and control inadequacies,26 and lack of political resolve
have led to failed peace-keeping efforts in Somalia and the former
Yugoslavia.27 Those stunning failures have prompted critics to
argue that an expanded U.N. peace-keeping role is not only
wasteful, but dangerous.' Most unsettling is the current "bash-
the-U.N." mood that prevails in the domestic political arena.29
21. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 10, at 1.
22. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/678 (1990). Resolution
678 granted member nations authority to "use all necessary means" to liberate Kuwait and
restore international peace and security in the region. Id.
23. Julia Preston, Waste in Somalia Typifies Failings of U.N. Management, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 1995, at All. Not surprisingly, commentators refer to peace-keeping as a
"growth industry." Walker, supra note 18, at 435.
24. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 10, at 2.
25. Preston, supra note 23, at All.
26. It
27. Carla Anne Robbins, GOP Bid to Downgrade U.N. Peacekeeping Role Is Likely




While the United Nations Slept
As the U.N. marks its fiftieth anniversary, it reaches a decisive
crossroad. In spite of recent setbacks, the turbulence of the post-
Cold War world highlights a growing need for greater U.N.
involvement in the settlement of disputes. Further, the current
balance of power still lends itself to active and successful U.N.
involvement in the maintenance of collective security.0
This Comment explores structural changes in the U.N. that
will better enable it to act as a tool for maintaining collective
security. Part II recommends a significantly expanded role for the
International Court of Justice. Part III discusses amending the
U.N. Charter's provision that gives veto power to the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council. Finally, Part IV probes
post-Cold War conflicts in Kuwait, Somalia, and the former
Yugoslavia, and offers solutions designed to refocus U.N. peace ef-
forts.
II. COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE
The International Court of Justice ("Court") was created in
1945 to be the principal judicial organ of the U.N.31 It stands
alongside the Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretariat,
among others, as one of the six branches of the organization.32
Initially, there were high hopes that the judicial process would
replace "the vicissitudes of war and the reign of brute force."33
For fifty years, however, the Court's contribution to resolving
international disputes has been minimal.' The Court exists
instead as an untapped resource for the pacific settlement of
international disputes.35
The heart of the problem can be found in the Court's
founding document. The Statute of the International Court of
30. "The end of the cold war was a major movement of tectonic plates and the after-
shocks continue to be felt. But even if the ground beneath our feet has not yet settled,
we still live in a new age that holds great promise for both peace and development."
BOUTROS BouTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 6 (2d ed. 1995).
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, 1.
33. Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and
Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 255, 321 (1994).
34. Id. Fewer than seventy-five disputes were lodged with the Court from 1945 to
1990. David J. Scheffer, Non-Judicial State Remedies and the Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 83, 85 (1990).
35. Gassama, supra note 33, at 321.
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Justice ("Statute") offers to the Court only minimal jurisdiction.36
Under the Charter, all member nations are ipso facto parties to the
Statute.37 The Statute itself, however, offers only two ways for
the Court to obtain jurisdiction.38 First, states may consent to
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. 39 Second, a signatory to the
Statute may recognize the Court's compulsory jurisdiction over it
before a matter arises.' Either way, the Court hears cases only
where both parties have given voluntary consent to the Court's
jurisdiction. Further, countries are free to set certain conditions on
any acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.41 Given this extremely
limited framework, the Court's contribution to ensuring the
maintenance of international peace and security has been all but
nonexistent because competing sovereign nations have consistently
turned to other means to settle international disputes.42
36. Id. at 322. The Court clearly has enforceable powers once member nations appear
for settlement of a given dispute. The U.N. Charter states that once a member state is a
party to a case before the Court, it must comply with the Court's decision. U.N. CHARTER
art. 94, 1 1. Failure to comply with a Court decision gives recourse to the adverse party
through the Security Council, which may act to enforce a decision of the Court. U.N.
CHARTER art. 94, 1 2.
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 93, 1 1.
38. Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides, in pertinent
part:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it
and all matters specifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or
in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to
any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all
legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an int-
ernational obligation.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, 1 1, 2.
39. Id. at art. 36, 1 2. In addition to providing consent to the Court's jurisdiction on
an ad hoc basis, jurisdiction may be contracted through treaty or convention
"compromissory clauses." Id; Scheffer, supra note 34, at 90.
40. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, '1 2. The United
Kingdom is the only permanent member of the Security Council which currently
recognizes the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Gassama, supra note 33, at 324.
41. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, 3.
42. Gassama, supra note 33, at 321-22. Commentators have offered two other reasons
why nations have been reluctant to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
First, Marxist or Third World nations may have been put off by the Court's strikingly
Western legal roots. Second, the judicial selection process may be too politicized for some
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The Court could be an invaluable asset to the pacific settle-
ment of international disputes. To further this purpose, the U.N.
should condition new and continued membership on mandatory
recognition of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in subject
matters detailed in Article 36 of the Statute.43 Such a change
would require deleting the phrases "may at any time" and "in
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation" from
paragraph two of Article 36.
Such a change, however, will not happen anytime soon.
Amending the Charter is extremely difficult and would require
U.S. support." Congress is acting currently to significantly limit
U.S. involvement in the U.N.4 5 Further, the notion of an interna-
tional court enjoining a U.S. President or Congress from taking ac-
and not fairly representative of the global population for others. Id. at 322 n.183. These
reasons, however, do not withstand scrutiny. Originally, most states favored mandatory
compulsory jurisdiction at the U.N. San Francisco conference in 1945, only to have its
implementation blocked by the United States and Soviet Union. Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1043, 1088-89 n.224 (1994). Since then, the major world powers have consistently
resisted compulsory jurisdiction as an encroachment upon national sovereignty. Id. at
1089. Also, the Court must apply customs and principles of international law, not just
those of Western nations. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38.
Further, Marxist and Third World states have been actively participating in activities of
the "strikingly Western" General Assembly for fifty years. With regard to the alleged
politicization of the Court, the Statute expressly forbids a country from having more than
one member on the Court at any given time. Id. at art. 3, '1 1. The Statute further forbids
Court members from acting in an administrative, political, or professional function, and
from hearing cases in which a conflict could exist. Id. at art. 16, 1 1; art. 17, 11 1, 2.
Together these provisions ensure an independent judiciary and preclude any one nation
from having too strong a voice on the Court.
43. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, 1 2(a)-(d).
44. Amending the Statute is as difficult as amending the Charter, which requires a
two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, a two-thirds vote of all members, and unanimous
support of the permanent members of the Security Council. STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 69; U.N. CHARTER art. 108.
Such an amendment should not be read to affect Article 95 of the Charter, which
allows member nations to resolve their differences in other fora by virtue of consensual
agreement. U.N. CHARTER art. 95. This proposed amendment simply would allow an
aggrieved state to hail an adverse member state into court.
45. Meisler, supra note 20, at Al. The Charter is a treaty, which has the same effect
in U.S. law as an act of Congress. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
Where a treaty conflicts with an act of Congress, the last expression of the sovereign
controls. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). As a result, acceptance
of mandatory compulsory jurisdiction through a Charter amendment would still be
susceptible to subsequent acts of Congress. As a practical matter, however, this would be
unlikely to occur, as withdrawal of such acceptance would result in a forfeiture of
membership in the U.N.
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tion, or ordering it to pay damages to another country, may seem
shocking to some.' The notion is so shocking that the United
States withdrew its long-standing acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction as soon as it became clear that the Court would
exercise that jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case. 7
A mandatory compulsory jurisdiction system would have a
significant positive impact on the pursuit of collective security.
First, member states would be able to argue their respective
positions in an objective judicial forum, rather than in the heated
arena of politics. Second, disputing parties would participate in an
added avenue of conflict resolution before resorting to more
confrontational measures. This detour would act as a delay
mechanism. It would increase the prospects of peaceful settlement
and allow the Security Council and the international community to
prepare for the implementation of future remedial measures, if
necessary. Third, decisions of the Court would give the Security
Council and the international community an unbiased and credible
mandate to take remedial action. Most importantly, member
states would get their "day in court," increasing the likelihood that
disputes peacefully resolved will remain peacefully resolved.
III. SECURITY COUNCIL ENFORCEMENT OF COURT DECISIONS
Even if U.N. member states were automatically subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court, a party still could fail either to recognize
the Court's jurisdiction or to comply with a Court order. In such
46. President Harry S. Truman, however, appeared to accept this concept, putting it
bluntly:
When Kansas and Colorado have a quarrel over the water in the Arkansas River
they don't call out the National Guard in each state and go to war over it. They
bring a suit in the Supreme Court of the United States and abide by the decision.
There isn't a reason in the world why we cannot do that internationally.
John K. Cooley, Truman's Advice on Water in the Desert Still.Holds, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Nov. 11, 1992; BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 655 (16th ed. 1992).
47. The United States recognized compulsory jurisdiction of the Court from 1945 to
1986, but reserved to its own jurisdiction disputes that were "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States, as determined by the United States." Gassama,
supra note 33, at 324 n.189 (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, the United States
withdrew its recognition of compulsory jurisdiction when it became apparent that the
above language would not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction in the Nicaragua
case. Id.; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United
States), 1984 I.CJ. 932 (Nov. 26).
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a situation, that party then would be subject to remedial action by
the Security Council."
Under the Charter, however, non-procedural decisions of the
Security Council must receive unanimous support from its
permanent members.4 9 The Charter prevents a member of the
Security Council from voting on resolutions in matters to which it
is a party with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression.' As a result, a Security Council
member cannot frustrate Security Council actions through use of
its veto power in matters of current or prospective military conflict.
This provision, however, does not prevent a permanent member
from using its veto power to impede Security Council measures
that are not directly related to threats to international peace.
History has demonstrated that the seeds of armed conflict are
sown over long periods of time and arise for various reasons.
Nevertheless, while a permanent member that is a party to a
dispute is unable to thwart the desire of the Security Council on
an issue of armed conflict, it is perfectly able to frustrate the
implementation of "non-military" Article 94 measures. Under this
framework, only the most urgent disputes, fraught with the worst
human consequences, are protected from the selfish veto of a
permanent Security Council member."' Court decisions unrelated
to ongoing breaches of the peace or to imminent threats to the
peace are effectively unenforceable against permanent members.
For this and other reasons, some have argued against the
permanent member veto power in the Security Council."2 The
veto power, however, is the primary restraint on the powers of the
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, 1 2.
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 3. Article 27 requires a "double veto" in that Security
Council decisions must receive approval from any nine of the fifteen council members as
well as unanimous approval of its five permanent members. Id
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 3. The Charter also prohibits members of the Security
Council from voting on issues of the pacific settlement of local disputes. Id
51. Even a Security Council member nation that is not a permanent member has the
ability to frustrate close Security Council votes because of the nine vote requirement for
passage. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 1 3.
52. The drafters of Article 27 were reluctant to require unanimous support of every
Security Council member in a given measure. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 12, at
214. They were similarly reluctant to require a mere majority or "special majority" vote.
It. The heart of Article 27 came from a compromise solution which was established at the
Crimea Conference in February, 1945. Id. at 215.
1995]
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Security Council.5" While merely a political check on the system,
the veto power should be maintained because it remains as an
effective protection against "excessive interventionism" by the
Security Council. 4
Rather than revoking the veto power, Article 27 of the
Charter should be amended to prohibit a Security Council member
from voting on an Article 94 enforcement measure where that
member was a party to the underlying matter.15  This change
would preclude a Security Council member from obstructing
Article 94 enforcement measures against it.56 Only with such an
amendment will the Security Council have the authority to enforce
Court decisions against any noncomplying party, even if that
noncomplying party is a permanent member of the Security
Council.
IV. PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
As the U.N. was formed from a wartime coalition,57 it
followed logically that the Charter would provide some framework
for armed collective security "to ensure that no state could ever
again drive the world to war., 58  Chapter VII of the Charter
directly addresses "enforcement of peace" among nations of the
world.59 The Charter empowers the Security Council to "deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and shall ... decide what measures shall be
taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and securi-ty. ''960
Over the U.N.'s first fifty years, three kinds of military
missions developed: large-scale enforcement, peace-keeping, and
peace enforcement. 61 In a large-scale enforcement action, as used
53. Matthias J. Herdegen, The "Constitutionalization" of the U.N. Security System, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 154 (1994).
54. Id
55. This restriction would be in addition to the restrictions already articulated in
Article 27 of the Charter.
56. Such an amendment also would prevent a prevailing party from voting in favor of
enforcement sanctions against the adverse party.
57. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 12, at 4.
58. James W. Houck, The Command and Control of United Nations Forces in the Era
of Peace Enforcement, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 6 (1993).
59. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 12, at 262.
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
61. See generally Houck, supra note 58, at 12-22.
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in Korea in the 1950s and Kuwait in 1991, an ad hoc coalition acts
under the authority, but not the command, of the Security
Council.62 Further, the coalition does not act as a neutral police
force, but rather as an active enforcer.6 Peace-keeping missions,
on the other hand, place U.N. commanded forces in a position of
neutrality, their presence being a deterrent to violence among
separate fighting armies.' In response to the pressures of the
post-Cold War world, a new model has developed-peace
enforcement. With characteristics that resemble both large-scale
enforcement operations and peace-keeping missions, peace
enforcement missions employ non-neutral U.N. forces which apply
active force "against any disputant who breaches the peace."
U.N. operations in Somalia and Bosnia have followed the peace
enforcement model.6
A. Charter Authority
Because peace-keeping operations are not mentioned
expressly in the Charter, their legal basis has been described as,
among other things, "ambiguous.' 67 Member states recognize
peace-keeping, however, as a legally supported model of action
despite the lack of any express provision in the Charter.' Thus,
widespread acceptance and tradition have carved out a legal
justification for employing peace-keeping measures where none
arguably existed.69 Despite the lack of express authority in the
Charter, peace-keeping missions have become a well-settled aspect
of international law.7'
Further, the Charter does authorize peace enforcement
missions under Chapter VII, which expressly empowers the
Security Council to raise forces "for the purpose of maintaining
62. Id. at 12-15.
63. Id. at 12-13.
64. Id. at 22; THE BLuE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING
4-5 (2d ed. 1990).
65. Houck, supra note 58, at 22.
66. Id. at 30.
67. Richard Lee Gaines, On the Road to a Pax UN.: Using the Peace Tools at our
Disposal in a Post-Cold War World, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 543,552 (1993). In fact,
former U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold once facetiously referred to peace-
keeping as falling under "Chapter Six and a half" of the U.N. Charter. Id.
68. Id. at 552-53.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 553 n.45.
1995]
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international peace and security."'" Article 43 agreements
between the U.N. and member states legally bind those participat-
ing states to commit a specified number of forces when the U.N.
calls upon them. 2 The issue of whether the Security Council may
"draft" member armed forces without a voluntary Article 43
agreement in place, however, remains unresolved.73  Despite the
original assumption that Article 39 missions would rarely occur,74
a solid basis of Charter authority exists for the armed settling of
international disputes.
B. Defining the Scope of International Disputes
Under Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council has the
power to determine whether a threat to the peace or a breach of
the peace exists, or if an act of aggression has occurred.75 The
Article provides no definition of the terms "threat," "breach," or
"aggression. ' 6 The Charter simply charges the Security Council
with determining whether such a situation exists.
The remainder of the Article, stating as its essential purpose
to "maintain or restore international peace and security," implicitly
precludes the Security Council from intervening in conflicts that
are essentially domestic in nature.77 Once again, the language of
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1 1.
72. Andrew S. Miller, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and the Legal
Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773, 780 (1993).
73. Id. at 778. Note that the Charter, which provides that the Security Council, under
its Article 39 authority, may mandatorily "call upon" member nations to apply measures
"not involving the use of armed force." U.N. CHARTER art. 41; GOODRICH & HAMBRO,
supra note 12, at 277. The omission of similar language in Article 43 plus the phrase "and
in accordance with a special agreement," indicates that the Security Council may not
"draft" armed forces of member nations without a prior Article 43 agreement. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 43, 1.
74. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 12, at 271.
75. Article 39 provides that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
76. At the 1945 U.N. Conference in San Francisco, many supported the inclusion of
a definition of "aggression" in the Article. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 12, at 263.
Some were "particularly fearful that the Great Powers would under certain conditions
close their eyes to aggressive action as a way of avoiding the obligation to take
enforcement measures." Id Because of the difficulty of creating a workable definition,
and because of resistance from the U.N.'s sponsoring governments, no definition found its
way into the Charter. Id. at 11, 264.
77. The Charter also expressly prohibits the U.N. from intervening "in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
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the provision is vague, with no hint of what separates domestic
disputes from international conflicts. By omission, Article 39
further implies that the Security Council also shall determine
whether an international conflict exists.
The effect of this ambiguous language is twofold. First, the
Security Council wields almost unlimited power.78 It alone
determines the existence of conflict, the international scope of the
conflict, and the measures necessary to address that conflict.
Second, the Security Council has neither legal nor practical
guidance as to where it should engage or, more importantly, where
it should not engage. As a result, while the Security Council has
exercised its authority actively in recent years, it has been far from
consistent in distinguishing domestic disputes from international
conflicts, and the overall results of its peacemaking efforts reflect
that inconsistency.
1. Bright Lines in Iraq
At first, distinguishing international conflicts from domestic
disputes seemed to be an easy task. Iraq's 1990 invasion and
subsequent occupation of Kuwait was a pure act of international
aggression. The Security Council, backed by an almost unanimous
international community, responded decisively to push Iraqi troops
behind its own border. 79 Even beyond the actual fighting, the
Security Council "imposed unprecedented requirements on Iraq"
under the Gulf War cease-fire resolution.' ° Those restrictions
included requiring Iraq to destroy its chemical and biological
weapons and manufacturing facilities.81 The Security Council also
ordered Iraq to destroy its ballistic missile production facilities and
inventory.'
! 7. As a result, if a dispute is of a domestic nature, the Security Council may not
authorize intervention without prior consent from the host-state. Gaines, supra note 67,
at 559. If a domestic dispute threatens to expand into a regional conflict outside the state's
borders, the Security Council may intervene. U.N. CHARTER art. 39; Anthony Clark
Arend, The United Nations and the New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 491, 496 (1993).
78. The only limitations on the Security Council's power are in its own voting and veto
provisions. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 3.
79. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2693d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
80. Arend, supra note 77, at 497.
81. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
82. Id Arend notes that the Security Council ordered the destruction of Iraq's
stockpile even though the mere possession of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles is not
banned by international treaty. Arend, supra note 77, at 498. While Iraq's possession of
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Reaching further, the Security Council ordered Iraq to accept
humanitarian assistance for its own Kurdish and Shiite citizens in
the aftermath of the Gulf War.' Resolution 688 was justified
under the philosophy that the imminent likelihood of citizens
fleeing their own country as refugees was a threat to international
security.' These other restrictions clearly fell under the Security
Council's Article 39 authority to take action against threats to the
peace, as Iraq's prior encroachment against Kuwait justified
preventing another similar occurrence. Currently, the Security
Council maintains a crippling economic embargo on Iraq because
of its failure to fully comply with Security Council resolutions.8 5
2. Closed Eyes' in Bosnia-Herzegovina
The once bright lines of armed conflict, however, have blurred
since the resolution of the Gulf War. For example, the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been something of an enigma, "particular-
ly difficult" to characterize as either purely domestic or interna-
tional. 7  Originally, the conflict had all the trappings of a full-
blown civil war. It was "a classic example of a fight for self-
determination in a newly established state . ... "' The issue
became blurred, however, when Croatia became "deeply involved"
in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict after Croatia and Serbia had
signed a U.N. peace agreement.' Also, it became clear early on
that no reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia would occur.'
Because of the confusion over the nature of the conflict, the
these weapons may not have violated international law, the preventative measures adopted
by the Security Council in Resolution 687 were justified under Article 39 of the Charter.
Without these measures, Iraq would have remained a viable military presence in the Gulf
region, and as a result, a continued threat to international peace would have existed.
83. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
84. Arend, supra note 77, at 499 (quoting Paul Lewis, U.N. Votes to Condemn
Handling of Iraq Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1991, at A5).
85. Julia Preston, U.N. Offers Plan to Ease Oil Embargo on Iraq for Humanitarian
Reasons, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1995, at A28.
86. See supra note 76.
87. Yoshiko Inoue, United Nations' Peace-keeping Role in the Post-Cold War Era.: The
Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMEP. LJ. 245, 250 (1993).
88. Id. at 251.
89. Id. at 252.
90. The United States and the European Community recognized the sovereignty of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina within a year after the breakup of Yugoslavia.
David Hoffman, U.S. Recognizes 3 Ex-Yugoslav States, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1992, at A19.
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Security Council was "slow and cautious" in its response to the
fighting in the former Yugoslavia.9'
At some point, though, the U.N. clearly had an excuse to
intervene. Once the fighting factions had been recognized as
independent and sovereign states, and Serbian forces had attempt-
ed to annex parts of Bosnia, the conflict took on an international
dimension as an act of aggression by one nation against another.'
Further, this became a conflict "of a special kind," namely a brutal
and aggressive genocidal assault by the Serbs against the Bosnian
population.'
When the Security Council finally acted, however, it opted for
the worst of all possible courses. First, by enacting an arms
embargo, the Council effectively rendered Bosnia helpless to
defend itself. 9' Second, the Security Council's belated measures
of intervention on Bosnia's behalf proved wholly inadequate.95
Although 24,000 U.N. forces are currently on duty in the Balkan
theater, they are lightly armed.96 Moreover, amid the bloodiest
European conflict since World War II,9 U.N. military strategy
has been frighteningly passive.9' The first U.N. airstrikes were
carried out only after sixty-eight civilians were killed following the
bombing of an open-air market.' Those airstrikes, however,
were ineffective and prompted a humiliation campaign by Serb
forces that included taking 150 U.N. peacekeepers hostage.10
Diplomats have been unfocused'0 1 and negotiators were at one
91. Id. at 252.
92. Id. at 251-52. "The fact that Serbs are claiming the right to annex parts of Bosnia
to the existing Serbian Republic is further evidence of the international nature of the
conflict, as such an act would be an outright invasion of a sovereign state." Id. at 252.
93. Craig Scott et al., A Memorial For Bosnia. Framework of Legal Arguments
Concerning the Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the United Nations Security Council's
Arms Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 72 (1994).
94. Id. at 72-73.
95. Id. at 73.
96. John Pomfret, Year in Bosnia Changes British General's View: About-Face of
U.N.'s Commander Rose Underscores Peacekeeping Force's Problems, WASH. POST, Jan.
23, 1995, at A10.
97. Id.
98. "The basic strategy of the U.N. mission appears to be to stay long enough to pick
up the pieces after the war is over." John Pomfret, By Default, U.N. Keeps 'Fig Leaf Role
in Bosnia, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1994, at A31.
99. Pomfret, supra note 96, at A10.
100. Id.
101. Joel Brand, Foreign Mediators in Bosnian War Split on How to Win Serbs' Assent,
WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1995, at A19.
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time resigned that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman would
eventually order U.N. troops out of Croatia."
What role the U.N. or its member states will play, if any, in
the conclusion of the Balkan conflict, remains unclear." Until
recently, U.N. member states showed neither the courage nor the
resolve to carry out the difficult comprehensive peace enforcement
measures they flirted with for almost three years10" This inac-
tion lingered in spite of the fact that the Security Council demon-
strated that it felt that it had the authority, under Article 39, to
intervene by ordering airstrikes." The only successful results of
intervention have come in the form of peace talks as the conse-
quence of a two-week campaign of sustained airstrikes against the
Bosnian Serbs' °6 Those airstrikes, however, were conducted by
NATO. As a result, the Western powers have "all but aban-
doned" any pretense that the U.N. controls intervention in the Balkans10
102. John Pomfret, U.S. Foresees Sending GIs to Help U.N. Quit Croatia" Tudjman's
Deadline Compounds War Risks, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1995, at Al. One western
diplomat expressed the "hope [that Tudjman will] change his mind." Id Tudjman did
change his mind, but only after Western nations promised his country $35 million in
reconstruction aid. Christine Spolar, UN. Deal on Croatia Fuels Hope for Peace Gains for
Zagreb Seen in Peacekeepers' Stay, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1995, at A34.
103. President Clinton specifically conditioned the introduction of U.S. combat troops
on the assurance of complete autonomy. Thomas E. Ricks and Robert S. Greenberger,
Clinton Would Consider Sending Troops to Bosnia, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1995, at All.
Under these conditions, U.N. commanders would have no control over U.S. troops.
Further, U.S. troops would not require U.N. approval to carry out protective airstrikes or
to alter "the all-important 'rules of engagement' that dictate how lethal firepower can be
used." Id. President Clinton backed away from those conditions, however, just a few days
later. William Drozdiak & Bradley Graham, European Force Set For Bosnia: U.S. to
Provide Support for Rapid-Reaction Unit, but No Ground Troops, WASH. POST, June 4,
1995, at Al.
104. A strong argument can be made that an Article 39 determination should not be
made "unless members are prepared to apply the additional measures listed in Chapter
VII" of the Charter. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 293 (3d ed. 1969).
105. Western inaction today recalls the appeasement and weakness of an earlier day.
"So they go on in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute,
adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent." WINSTON S. CHUR-
CHILL, WHILE ENGLAND SLEPT 326-27 (1938).
106. Mark M. Nelson & Carla A. Robbins, Tentative Deal Suspends Bosnia Bombing,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1995, at A12.
107. Thomas E. Ricks & Mark M. Nelson, NATO Shows New Resolve With Air Strikes
in Bosnia, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1995, at A3. Where many bright lines of encroachment
existed in Iraq, few exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Iraq's clear-cut encroachment against
Kuwait, in addition to the extraordinary strategic value of Kuwait as an oil producing
nation, may explain why the U.N. has acted so weakly in Bosnia where it acted so
forcefully in Iraq.
966
While the United Nations Slept
3. "God's Work""t)a in Somalia
In Somalia, the U.N. took a giant step toward further blurring
the lines between domestic and international conflicts. Operation
Restore Hope, a humanitarian mission, sent U.S. troops "to open
supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for
a U.N. peace-keeping force . .. ."' The primary obstacle to
achieving this short-term goal,1 however, was the dominant
presence of armed gangs, who had effective control of the limited
transportation arteries in Somalia."' President Bush articulated
a stern warning to those who threatened to impede the success of
the humanitarian mission: "[W]e will not tolerate armed gangs
ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by
starvation."'' 2 As a result, the mission quickly transformed into
a crusade to disarm local warring military factions."
3
Neither threats nor force worked in Somalia. The failure to
disarm Somali factions resulted in intense fighting with forces loyal
to General Mohammed Farah Aidid,"4 leading to unacceptable
casualties for a U.N. humanitarian mission."' In terms of its
efforts to prevent starvation, Operation Restore Hope was a
temporary success. But, for all its nation-building aspirations, the
U.N. adventure in Somalia was an unmitigated disaster.116
108. In asking the American people to support Operation Restore Hope, President
George Bush described the proposed military operation in Somalia as "doing God's
Work." Bush: 'The People of Somalia ... the Children ... Need Our Help.' WASH. POST,
Dec. 5, 1992, at A16.
109. id.
110. Bush promised that the mission would not be open-ended, stating that forces
would "not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary." Dan Oberdorfer, Bush
Sends Forces to Help Somalia: 'America Must Ac4' President Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 5,
1992, at Al. In March 1995, 1,800 U.S. Marines landed in Mogadishu to guard the last
retreating U.N. forces. Rick Atkinson, Marines Dig In to Guard U.N. 's Somalia Pullout,
WASH. POST, March 1, 1995, at A23.
111. Oberdorfer, supra note 110, at Al.
112. 1d.
113. Gassama, supra note 33, at 294.
114. 1d. at 295.
115. Most devastating to U.S. public opinion was the October 3, 1993, ambush that
resulted in the deaths of eighteen American soldiers. The raid was compared to the 1968
Tet Offensive, which shook American public support for its involvement in Vietnam.
Keith B. Richburg, Aideed's Urban War, Propaganda Victories Echo Vietnam, WASH.
POST, Oct. 6, 1993, at A12.
116. Peace-keeping in Somalia ballooned into a $1 billion per year mission. Preston,
supra note 23, at All.
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C. Clarifying Article 39
The dismal failure in Somalia illustrates how easily a U.N.
mission can become ensnared in a largely domestic conflict.117
The Balkan quagmire further demonstrates the lack of guidance
from the Charter in distinguishing international conflicts from
domestic disputes, and how that lack of guidance fosters indecision
at the highest levels of command. Unfortunately, these problems
will not simply fade away with the passing of their respective
conflicts. The international scene is forever changing, military
technology is forever advancing, and the threat of war is forever
present. It is time to refocus the vision of U.N. peace-keeping.
To clarify the purpose of U.N. peace-keeping missions,
Security Council responses to "act[s] of aggression" and
"breach[es] of the peace" should be strictly limited to conflicts
between distinct sovereign nations."8 Further, the term "threat
to the peace" in Article 39 should be defined to include essentially
domestic disputes that are likely to become regional conflicts and
situations where an aggressor nation threatens to encroach upon
another. Under this reading of the provision, for example, the
Security Council would have had Article 39 authority in Somalia
if at any time it appeared that the battle would spill over into
other countries. Similarly, the Council would have Article 39
authority if it ever appeared that Iraqi forces were preparing to
attack Kuwait for a second time.1 9 Such an amendment to
Article 39 would necessarily preclude the Security Council from
intervening in matters not within the scope of its authority as origi-
nally envisioned by the framers of the Charter. Further, U.N.
117. More troubling, the Somalia mission seemed to muddle the primary purpose of the
U.N., namely, to settle international disputes and to intervene where domestic disputes
threaten international peace. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 1.
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The primary purpose of the U.N., as laid out in Article
One, must be read with respect to its historical context. The U.N. was created as a tool
to respond to "acts of aggression" that had previously gone unchecked. U.N. CHARTER
art. 1, 1 1. Nowhere does Chapter VII of the Charter express or imply an intent to settle
civil wars or build nations.
119. Such an amendment also would restrict Security Council action in certain
situations. For example, the Security Council never would have had the authority to
engage in peace enforcement in Somalia because the international community never
recognized the sovereign independence of any tribes within the region. In the Balkan
conflict, however, the Security Council would have had authority to intervene early in the
conflict, as the European Union had recognized the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia
six months after fighting began.
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peace-keeping actions would maintain clear and decisive objectives
throughout the course of a given confiict.1n
D. The Failure of Peace Enforcement
The terrific command and control obstacles confronting U.N.
military commanders in peacemaking operations have played a
significant role in the disasters in Bosnia and Somalia.' In early
1995, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed
establishing a Rapid-Reaction Force under the umbrella of the
Security Council." The force would act as a specially trained
reserve force on "permanent call" to the U.N., ready to respond
to international military emergencies. 23
The Boutros-Ghali proposal was not exactly ground break-
ing." It echoed calls made over the past several years for some
kind of a standing U.N. military force. ' Proponents for creating
such a standing army argue that reliance on ad hoc coalitions to
maintain international peace and security is no longer a realistic
option in the post-Cold War world." 6 It was Boutros-Ghali's
proposal, however, that was received as "out of step with the
120. Article 39 also could be defined by way of an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, 1. Advisory opinions of the
Court carry great weight under the Charter, and have been used frequently as a basis for
continued action. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 104, at 569.
121. "As a result of experiences in Somalia and Bosnia, U.N. officials have found they
do not have the military capability to go beyond cautious, nonbelligerent peacekeeping."
Julia Preston, U.N. Aide Proposes Rapid-Reaction Unit In Face of US. Congressional
Opposition; Boutros-Ghali's Plan Appears to Have Little Chance, WASH. POST, Jan. 6,
1995, at A23.
122. Id.
123. Id. Boutros-Ghali "insisted that the United Nations must have sole command over
troops in its peacekeeping missions." Id.
124. Others have previously argued for creating a U.N. Rapid Deployment Force
("RDF"). The RDF would "not be ... held permanently under U.N. command, but
would be activated by the Security Council only when needed for emergencies." Miller,
supra note 72, at 784-85 (discussing Richard Gardner's 1992 proposal for organizing
permanent U.N. military forces).
125. The other proposals for expanded U.N. peace-keeping operations constitute a
three-tiered structure that includes: (1) a Standing Reserve Peace Force; (2) a Rapid
Response Peace Force; and (3) a Permanent Peace-keeping Force. Alan K. Henrikson,
How Can the Vision of a 'New World Order' Be Realized?, 16 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
63, 76 (1992).
126. Id at 74.
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negative mood in many capitals about further empowering the
United Nations"127
The current system, which utilizes voluntary stand-by
arrangements, is not working either. The U.N. presently has
agreements with dozens of countries to voluntarily provide troops
and equipment for peace-keeping missions." These agreements,
however, are not binding.1 9  Not surprisingly, when chaos
erupted in Rwanda last year, no country mobilized peace-keeping
forces to stop the bloodshed. 3
The arguments for and against creating a universal armed
force have not changed much in the last eighty years Framers of
both the League of Nations Covenant and the U.N. Charter
considered proposals for establishing an "internationalized"
standing armed force.' Both times, the respective framers
rejected such proposals because of political difficulties.'3 On the
other hand, reliance on ad hoc coalitions, the failed model of the
League of Nations, was equally unacceptable to the framers of the
U.N. Charter.
1 33
This is the troublesome paradox that confronts the U.N. on its
fiftieth anniversary. The international community formed the U.N.
on the assumption, based on practical experience, that ad hoc
coalitions were not an effective way to keep the peace. Yet, from
that assumption it follows that the U.N., to successfully enforce the
peace, must possess some inherent authority to mobilize its
member states to military action, even where a state may oppose
127. Preston, supra note 121, at A23. A NATO-led Rapid Reaction Force, quite
different from the one envisioned by Boutros-Ghali, signalled the end of U.N. influence
in the Balkan theater. Its unsanctioned movements completely bypassed the U.N. chain
of command. John Pomfret, British-French Force in Bosnia Tells U.N.: You Don't Control
Us, WASH. POST, July 29, 1995, at A16.
128. Preston, supra note 121, at A23.
129. Id
130. Id. The United States had a similar stand-by arrangement with the U.N. It
mobilized troops to Rwanda for humanitarian purposes only. Id.
131. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 104, at 317.
132. Id "[E]ncroachment on national sovereignty was likely to be unacceptable to
many, including the United States Congress." Id. This point is well taken. While it is one
thing to hail a member state into court as a privilege of U.N. membership, it is entirely
another matter to order that member state onto the field of battle where that member
state has anything less than one hundred per cent support for the action.
133. Id. at 318. The final version of Article 43 was a compromise approach. Member
states could maintain their sovereignty while concurrently providing the Security Council
with an advance military capability. Id.
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the proposed action. Few if any, however, have the faith or the
desire to give up such broad sovereign authority no matter how
noble the cause.
In this context, it is apparent that "peace enforcement"
missions ultimately are unworkable. Without real authority to
"draft" members into action, a peace enforcement mission is
essentially no different than a mission formed from an ad hoc
coalition. Sovereign autonomy would be compromised, however,
if the Security Council had the power to draft members into
action. Further, because peace enforcement missions do not
contain the same sweeping objectives as those in ad hoc coalitions,
peace enforcement missions resemble awkward "police actions,"
where a limited mission objective strangles a fighting force's
effectiveness. As a result, limited authority is combined with
limited resources to return limited results.
From that assessment, the outlook for the U.N. as a player in
the maintenance of international peace appears bleak. The
inherent limitations of peace enforcement missions have shown
that the U.N. is little more than its toothless predecessor, the
League of Nations, in this regard because it does not have the
authority to accomplish what it was designed to achieve. This
notion rests, however, upon the flawed assumption that ad hoc
coalitions are necessarily ineffective models to enforce the peace.
To the contrary, the world has relied successfully on ad hoc
coalitions to prevent a third world war for over fifty years. The
victory in the Gulf War, prosecuted by an ad hoc coalition of
member forces, was arguably the U.N.'s finest hour.
To rely on the formation of ad hoc coalitions, however, is to
rely on the courage of leaders to deter aggressors before conflicts
escalate beyond control. That is arguably unsettling, as the future
strength of the U.N. will vary with the strength and discipline of
its member states. It is, however, the only practical option that
will ever be available. Institutions don't enforce peace, people do.
By only relying on peace-keeping missions and ad hoc coalitions,
the trappings of peace enforcement will disappear. U.N. military
efforts will cease to be half-hearted and half-baked.
V. CONCLUSION
By tying its membership to compulsory recognition of
jurisdiction under the International Court of Justice, the U.N. will
solve many international disputes without deploying a single
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battalion. Further, an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter
would give the Security Council the power to enforce Court deci-
sions against all its members, including permanent members. On
the peace-keeping side, Article 39 of the Charter should be
clarified to settle expectations and to provide a clear path of action
for the Security Council as it moves into the 21st century. Finally,
peace enforcement "should be struck from the U.N.'s vocabulary"
so that international peace may be maintained through the
traditional use of ad hoc coalitions and peace-keeping forces."
Peace-keeping is the U.N.'s most visible and scrutinized
activity.135 The credibility and success of the body as a whole
rests upon its ability to keep the peace effectively. As the League
of Nations was doomed by impotence, 36 so too will the U.N. if
it fails to meet the coming challenges. The only certainty facing
the U.N. is that the problems of international peace-keeping will
not get any easier in the 21st century. As the U.N. marks its
fiftieth birthday, some have noble aspirations that the U.N. will be
an instrument for giving the phrase "new world order" true mean-
ing.117 One wonders, however, if history will repeat itself to see
the U.N. follow the same failed footsteps of the League of Nations.
Patrick Reilly*
134. Nancy Landon Kassebaum & Lee Hamilton, Fix the U.N.: At 50, It's Sick But
Savable-and We Need to Keep it Going, WASH. POST, June 25, 1995, at C7.
135. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 10, at 2. Peace-keeping attracts the greatest amount of
attention even though seventy to eighty percent of the work done by the U.N. is unrelated
to war. Id.
136. CHURCHILL, supra note 13, at 120-21.
137. The phrase "new world order" has meant many things to many people. It
represents everything from offering "new ways of working with other nations," to
expanding the U.N.'s peace-keeping role, to fulfilling an American need "to find grand
justifications for fighting wars." Even national security advisor Brent Scowcroft
complained that the new world order had become a "'catch phrase' that had become
endowed with grandiose meanings beyond anything he or Bush originally conceived."
Oberdorfer, supra note 1, at A31.
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